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A Case for Reforming the Anti-Money Laundering
Regulatory Regime: How Financial Institutions’ Criminal
Reporting Duties Have Created an Unfunded Private Police
Force
CHRISTOPHER J. WILKES*
INTRODUCTION
Under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and related anti-money laundering regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), financial institutions, their employees, and many other business
professionals are expected to report to authorities when they suspect that their
customers have committed money laundering offenses or other financial crimes.1
The criminal reporting duties conferred on financial institutions under the Bank
Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) regulatory regime expanded in
July 2018, when the Customer Due Diligence Rule (“CDD Rule”) came into effect.2
The CDD Rule closed loopholes in the provisions already in place by requiring
financial institutions to implement additional procedures for verifying the identities
of their customers.3 Prior to the CDD Rule, the verification requirements did not
extend to “shell” companies, which criminals often organize to disguise their
identities as the true underlying owners.4 The anonymity that shell companies
provide allows them to launder their illegally gained proceeds into apparently
legitimate businesses without drawing the attention of law enforcement.5 In addition,
the CDD Rule requires financial institutions to monitor their customers for changes

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. B.A., 2013, Butler
University. A special thanks to my parents and three sisters (Gabrielle, Isabella, and Sophia)
for their love and support and to the members of the Indiana Law Journal––particularly,
Brittni Crofts Wassmer––for their hard work and careful editing. I also wish to thank Professor
Joseph Hoffmann for his invaluable mentorship and feedback. All errors are mine.
1. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.);
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov
/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010) [https://perma.cc/6KJP-K3FC].
2. FinCEN Reminds Financial Institutions that the CDD Rule Becomes Effective Today,
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (May 11, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news
-releases/fincen-reminds-financial-institutions-cdd-rule-becomes-effective-today
[https://perma.cc/5S2V-8NNG]. The CDD Rule was issued in May 2018. Customer Due
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024 & 1026).
3. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2019) (establishing the requirements of the Customer
Identification Program).
4. See Louise Story, U.S. Plans to Require Banks to Identify Owners of Shell Companies,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/americas/us-plans-to
-require-banks-to-identify-owners-of-shell-companies.html [https://perma.cc/33VD-NMDU].
5. Ed Leefeldt, How “Shell” Companies Launder Dirty Money, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-shell
-companies-launder-dirty-money/ [https://perma.cc/4QLA-4XCD].
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in activity that should raise their suspicions of possible criminal activity and trigger
their reporting duties.6
Although these developments in the law may be viewed as positive changes,
federal regulators’ increased reliance on banks to serve as the eyes and ears of law
enforcement is unusual in that the law traditionally rejects imposing obligations to
report crimes on private actors.7 Surely, if a financial institution or its employees are
complicit in a money laundering scheme or actively assist in its commission, they
may be charged as participants in the offense itself, regardless of their lack of
involvement in the underlying criminal activity from which the funds were derived.8
But the reporting laws require more than merely not being part of the problem—
financial institutions have a duty to stay abreast of the emerging methods and trends
in laundering illegitimate proceeds.9
Federal regulators have ensured their strict compliance through harsh civil and
criminal penalties.10 For example, Banamex USA, a subsidiary bank of Citigroup,
agreed to pay $140 million in 2015 for deficiencies in its BSA/AML compliance
program.11 Three of the bank’s executives were also fined tens of thousands of
dollars and effectively barred from the banking industry as a result of the same
enforcement action.12 The penalty amounted to one-sixth of the bank’s total assets,

6. See infra text accompanying notes 64–65.
7. See Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan”
Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 975 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Mathew Paulose Jr., United States v. McDougald: The Anathema to 18
U.S.C. § 1956 and National Efforts Against Money Laundering, 21 Fordham Int’l L.J. 253,
253 (1997) (“The investigation involves . . . an inquiry into whether [Citibank] knowingly
accepted, deposited, and disseminated more than US$100 million in allegedly illegitimate
income . . . . If the inquiry proves true, the Justice Department will charge Citibank for money
laundering . . . .”). The consequences for such involvement are severe. For example, a bank
convicted of money laundering may have its charter terminated, known as the “death penalty,”
and the government can seize and attach either the laundered money or substitute bank assets
in forfeiture actions. Whitney Adams, Effective Strategies for Banks in Avoiding Criminal,
Civil, and Forfeiture Liability in Money Laundering Cases, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 669, 685, 698
n.199 (1993).
9. Adams, supra note 8 at 693.
10. Treasury Order 180-01 lists FinCEN’s duties to administer the BSA. Treas. Order
180-01(3)(a) (July 1, 2014). The BSA established the guidelines for how financial institutions
are to detect and report money laundering. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–32 (2012).
11. Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citigroup Statement on Banamex USA (July 22, 2015),
https://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2015/150722a.htm [https://perma.cc/CVN3-6NNZ].
12. Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Citigroup Agrees to $97.4 Million Settlement in
Money Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/citigroup-settlement-banamex-usa-inquiry.html
[https://perma.cc/7G3R-R5PS]. The Treasury Department, through the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, can bring actions against banking industry officials enjoining them “from participating,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of any ‘financial institution’ . . . that is
located in the United States or conducts business within the United States . . . .” Complaint at
2, 5, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 14 CV 9987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014); see also 31
U.S.C. § 5320 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to bring civil actions in district
court to enjoin violations or enforce compliance).
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so it was likely not a coincidence that Citigroup announced its plans to close
Banamex USA on the same day it shared news of the settlement.13
Such large penalties are not the exception but the norm, as both the number of
enforcement actions brought against financial institutions for inadequate BSA/AML
compliance and the dollar value of the fines have both soared in the past decade.14
As another example, in 2012, British bank HSBC agreed to a record $1.92 billion
settlement with U.S. federal and state authorities to avoid a criminal indictment for
inadequate BSA/AML compliance.15 In light of the law’s historical reluctance to
criminalize the failure to report crimes, the strictly enforced and costly reporting
obligations imposed on financial institutions under the BSA/AML regulatory regime
appear anomalous.16 In effect, the current scheme outsources law enforcement duties
to private institutions, and it deputizes them as government agents responsible for
preventing, monitoring, and investigating money laundering crimes.17
This policy decision raises not only normative questions about whether financial
institutions ought to bear these duties, and to what extent, but also positive questions
about the BSA/AML regime’s effectiveness and efficiency in deterring money
laundering. Industry leaders and lobbyists have increasingly criticized FinCEN for
providing little guidance on how to comply with BSA/AML reporting requirements,
and there is evidence suggesting that the benefits of criminal reporting do not
outweigh the costs of compliance.18 Accordingly, policymakers are under growing
pressure to adopt reform measures that would shift the costs of the BSA/AML
regulatory regime to the public sector.19

13. Lanier Saperstein, Geoffrey Sant & Michelle Ng, The Failure of Anti-Money
Laundering Regulation: Where Is the Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2
(2015); Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., supra note 11.
14. Robert Kim, Feeding the Beasts: Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement in 2009-2016,
BLOOMBERG BNA: NEWS (July 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking
-law/feeding-the-beasts-anti-money-laundering-enforcement-in-2009-2016?context=search
&index=103 [https://perma.cc/Q475-CZD4].
15. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges
of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over
-money-laundering/ [https://perma.cc/6MTM-2XZA].
16. To further demonstrate the costs associated with BSA/AML compliance, U.S. firms
collectively spend $25.3 billion per year on their compliance programs. Press Release,
LexisNexis Risk Sols., Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Costs U.S. Financial Services
Firms $25.3 Billion Per Year, According to LexisNexis Risk Solutions (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20181010-true-cost-aml
[https://perma.cc/UWA7-QY7X].
17. See Examining the BSA/AML Regulatory Compliance Regime: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,115th Cong. 1
(2017) (statement of Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit) [hereinafter Hearing]; A New Paradigm: Redesigning the U.S. AML/CFT
Framework to Protect National Security and Aid Law Enforcement, THE CLEARING HOUSE 3
(2017) [hereinafter A New Paradigm].
18. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 17, at 16 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).
19. A New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 10–18.
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In spite of the financial sector’s growing pushback, law enforcement officials
continue to defend the importance of criminal reporting,20 and as the implementation
of the new CDD Rule shows, regulators are willing to expand the regime. This begs
another question: if their claims about the value of the information in financial
institutions’ reports are true, then why are similar criminal reporting requirements
not imposed on other private actors, such as Facebook, who might just as easily assist
law enforcement in detecting possible criminal activity?
To analyze the case for reforming the BSA/AML regulatory regime, this Note
follows two related lines of inquiry. First, it looks to other mandatory criminal
reporting laws to derive a framework of normative principles that justify the
imposition of criminal reporting requirements on private actors.21 These principles
are then applied to the BSA/AML criminal reporting requirements to argue that a
policy that almost entirely shifts law enforcement duties to financial institutions is
not only anomalous but excessive given the law’s reluctance to criminalize failures
to report crime.22 To further illustrate this point, this Note suggests that the
government’s same crime-deterrence rationale for imposing strict criminal reporting
duties under the BSA/AML regulatory regime could seemingly extend to numerous
other private actors who are equally as likely to encounter criminal activity.23 As part
of its second line of inquiry, this Note conducts a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the
major arguments for and against reform of the BSA/AML regulatory scheme, before
considering how recent proposals to reform the regime could alleviate some of the
burdens imposed on private institutions.24
Part I of this Note provides background information outlining the relevant
BSA/AML laws that establish financial institutions’ affirmative duties to report
financial crimes. Part II analyzes the contours of other laws that create mandatory
criminal reporting obligations, including their extent, their underlying justifications,
and how stringently government agencies enforce them. Part III demonstrates how
financial institutions’ reporting duties are uniquely stringent and punitive compared
to those imposed elsewhere in the law, and it questions the justifications of this
policy. Lastly, Part IV of this Note argues that the BSA/AML regulatory regime
could be reformed to reduce the costs and duties borne by financial institutions
without sacrificing the government’s interests in deterring money laundering and
ensuring national security. To be clear, this Note does not advocate for the
elimination of BSA/AML reporting duties. Rather, it argues that the current
BSA/AML regulatory regime would be more consistent with its stated objectives if
federal policymakers adopted measures that reduce the disproportionate costs and
perverse incentives discussed in this Note.
I. THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATORY SCHEME
Section I.A of this Note first explains how criminals launder illegally gained
proceeds, and it describes the benefits that they derive from doing so. Next, Section

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra text accompanying notes 233–234.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Part III.
See infra text accompanying notes 263–265
See infra Section IV.D.
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I.B traces the historical development of the BSA/AML regulatory regime and
examines how each major legislative act has expanded financial institutions’ role in
combating financial crime. Section I.C concludes by defining the several affirmative
duties imposed on the financial institutions by the regulatory scheme.
A. Definition of Money Laundering
Money laundering is the process “by which one conceals the existence, illegal
source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it
appear legitimate.”25 In other words, it is making illegally gained, or “dirty money,”
appear “clean.”26 Money laundering generally involves three steps: (1) placement,
(2) layering, and (3) integration.27 Placement is the most difficult step in which
money launderers are most vulnerable, as they must find a way to enter large sums
of cash into the legitimate financial system without drawing the attention of law
enforcement.28 This is typically accomplished by funneling the money through
“front” operations (e.g., jewelry stores and check-cashing operations) or converting
it into negotiable instruments that can be directly deposited into banks (e.g., cashier’s
checks).29 In the next step, layering, the aim is to create confusion by transferring the
funds through numerous accounts in a complex series of transactions that make it
difficult for law enforcement agencies to trace the money’s origins.30 Often, the
money is wired to accounts in offshore banking havens in countries with strict bank
secrecy laws, where money launderers can create additional confusion by forming
“shell” companies that conceal the identity of their beneficial owners.31 The
anonymity provided by these companies allows money launderers to funnel illegal
proceeds into these accounts under the guise of a legitimate business. 32 Alternatively,
they may use the value of the offshore accounts as security (or collateral) to take out
loans in other countries.33 In the final step, integration, the funds reenter the
mainstream financial system and appear as legal proceeds.34 The personal and
commercial transactions involved at this stage can range from purchasing luxury

25. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984).
26. History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/W6KZ-SGCJ].
27. Id.
28. Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat
It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 149 (1995).
29. Id.
30. Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering:
A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral
Policy Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 263, 268 (2003); History of Anti-Money Laundering
Laws, supra note 24.
31. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 150; see also Lacey & George, supra note 30, at 268 (“The
beneficial owners of the shell companies are hidden beneath layers of bank secrecy laws and
the exercise of the attorney-client privilege.”).
32. See Leefeldt, supra note 5.
33. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 150.
34. Lacey & George, supra note 30, at 268.
THE
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goods to investing in business ventures or various financial instruments.35 Again, the
end goal is to provide the criminal with access to the proceeds by giving them the
appearance of legitimacy.36
B. The Role of Financial Institutions in the Fight Against Money Laundering
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) established the U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s authority to require financial institutions to record and report their
customer’s transactions and to assist government agencies in detecting money
laundering violations.37 Although the BSA does not define the types of reports that
financial institutions must file or criminalize the act of money laundering itself, it
serves as an enabling statute that empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations on the types of reports it expects to collect. 38 The goal of the BSA was to
create a paper trail of financial transactions and records that could be used to
prosecute the underlying crimes of money laundering (e.g., drug trafficking, tax
evasion, terrorism).39 For instance, pursuant to the powers conferred by the BSA, the
Secretary of the Treasury requires Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) to be filed
when a domestic financial institution is involved in a payment, receipt, or transfer of
currency greater than $10,000.40
In response to financial institutions’ duty to file CTRs, money launderers began
to divide their transactions into smaller amounts to avoid detection in a process called
“smurfing” or “structuring.”41 Moreover, many banks, recognizing that the fines for
not filing CTRs were relatively small and that investigations were rare, exploited
loopholes in the BSA.42 Federal lawmakers at the time noted the ineffectiveness of
the BSA in deterring money laundering, and they passed the next major piece of
AML legislation: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MCLA).43 The

35. Alison S. Bachus, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the International
Fight Against Money Laundering After September 11, 2001, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 835,
845 (2004); see also Sultzer, supra note 28, at 151 (listing some of the different financial
instruments used by money launderers to integrate illicit funds).
36. What Is Money Laundering?, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/what-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/F36K-PNBZ].
37. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.);
FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/fincens-mandate-congress
[https://perma.cc/J775-KKNW].
38. Paul Fagyal, The Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the Patriot Act: Should They
Be Allowed to Sunset?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1361, 1370 (2006).
39. See 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter . . . to require certain
reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence
activities, including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.”); see also Fagyal,
supra note 38, at 1370.
40. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.310–.311 (2019).
41. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1374.
42. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 158–59.
43. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–
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MCLA made both money laundering and structuring crimes in and of themselves,
and it provided for civil and criminal forfeitures of funds and property involved in
money laundering.44 An individual convicted of money laundering can face up to
twenty years in prison and up to a $500,000 fine.45
The BSA/AML regulatory framework broadened again with the passage of the
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 (“Act”).46 The Act changed
the role of financial institutions under the BSA/AML regime in two major ways: (1)
it created the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR);47 and (2) it set forth the minimum
requirements for financial institutions’ BSA/AML compliance programs.48 The
effect of the SAR requirement is that the responsibility for determining which reports
should be filed shifted from the government to the banks,49 as they ultimately decide
whether or not to file an SAR with FinCEN in response to suspicious activity, and
they must document the reasons underlying each one of their decisions.50 FinCEN is
a bureau administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury that collects
information about financial transactions to combat money laundering and
terrorism.51 FinCEN was created in 1990 as an intelligence network designed to
support the detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering crimes.52
A financial institution is expected to file an SAR with FinCEN when the bank
knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that:

1957, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1353–1354, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324–5326 (1988)); see also Sultzer, supra note
26, at 159 (recounting the shortcomings of the BSA that led to the passage of the MCLA).
44. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 159. See infra note 194 for a discussion about forfeiture
actions under the BSA/AML regulatory regime.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2012).
46. Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); see also Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1375–76 (discussing
how the Act changed the BSA/AML regulatory regime).
47. The Act provided the statutory authority for the SAR by authorizing the Secretary of
the Treasury to require financial institutions “to report any suspicious transaction relevant to
a possible violation of law or regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2012). Financial institutions
are expected to file SARs that report their customer’s criminal activities, or their suspicions
thereof, to FinCEN. See Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct:
Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 653–54
(1995).
48. See Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1376–77. See infra text accompanying notes 63 and 64
for the minimum requirements of financial institutions’ BSA/AML compliance programs.
49. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1376.
50. Suspicious Activity Reporting—Overview, FFIEC: BSA/AML MANUAL,
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/RegulatoryRequirements/04 [https://perma.cc/Y2EZ-JQ92].
51. 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012). Although this Note focuses primarily on the role of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and FinCEN in the BSA/AML regulatory regime, there are at least
six other major policymakers involved in the fight against money laundering: (1) the U.S.
Department of Justice; (2) the Office of the U.S. Attorney General; (3) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); (4) the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); (5) the Federal Reserve Board;
and (6) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Sultzer, supra note 28, at 179–80.
52. Treas. Order 105-08 (Apr. 25, 1990); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra
note 1.
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(i) The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or is
intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived
from illegal activities (including, without limitation, the ownership,
nature, source, location, or control of such funds or assets) as part of a
plan to violate or evade any law or regulation or to avoid any transaction
reporting requirement under Federal law;
(ii) The transaction is designed to evade any regulations promulgated
under the Bank Secrecy Act; or
(iii) The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not
the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to
engage, and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the
transaction after examining the available facts, including the background
and possible purpose of the transaction.53
The kind of customer conduct that should alert financial institutions of possible
criminal activity largely depends on a customer’s individual risk profile, which is
created by a bank when a customer opens an account and is then used as a benchmark
for identifying unusual transactions.54
Congress expanded FinCEN’s role in 1994 to include responsibilities for
administering the BSA.55 Today, the agency’s primary duties are concentrated on
collecting the CTRs and SARs filed by financial institutions and sharing them with
partners in the law enforcement community.56 Congress gives FinCEN a broad range
of other responsibilities as well: the agency analyzes data in support of
investigations, it exchanges information with foreign financial intelligence unit
counterparts, it manages data storage to ensure government-wide access, it issues and
interprets regulations related to combating money laundering, and it enforces
compliance with those regulations.57
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Title III of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”) included AML provisions that
broadened the role of financial institutions in exposing terrorist networks.58 First, the
types of financial institutions required to submit SARs expanded to include casinos,
insurance companies, brokers and dealers in securities, currency dealers and
exchangers, jewelers, dealers in precious metals and stones, and mutual funds.59 The

53. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4) (2019).
54. See infra text accompanying note 72.
55. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2010).
56. Financial
Crimes
Enforcement
Network,
U.S.
DEP’T
TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010)
[https://perma.cc/9A6B-B7FA].
57. 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2) (2012); Treas. Order 180-01(3)(a) (July 1, 2014); see also What
We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/Z27M-SLFW].
58. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1362.
59. Id. at 1378–79; BSA Timeline, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-and-regulations/bank-secrecy-act/bsa-timeline
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Patriot Act also assigned the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to add to the list
of covered institutions any business or agency that is similar to the others already
included, as well as any others that are useful in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.60
In addition, the Patriot Act established the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) laws,
which require financial institutions to verify the identity of their customers at account
opening.61 Still in effect today, KYC laws direct financial institutions to, at a
minimum, implement procedures that are designed to meet the following objectives:
(A) verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account to
the extent reasonable and practicable;
(B) maintaining records of the information used to verify a person's
identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and
(C) consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations provided to the financial institution by any government
agency to determine whether a person seeking to open an account
appears on any such list.62
C. The CDD Rule: “The Fifth Pillar” of Effective Compliance
Prior to the passage of the new CDD Rule, an effective BSA/AML compliance
program had four essential “pillars”:
(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls;
(B) the designation of a compliance officer;
(C) an ongoing employee training program; and
(D) an independent audit function to test programs.63
The CDD Rule, which became effective in July 2018, created a fifth core pillar of
effective BSA/AML compliance.64
The CDD Rule’s fifth pillar expects financial institutions to implement risk-based
procedures for customer due diligence as part of an ongoing duty to monitor their
customers.65 The duty begins when a customer opens a new account, at which point
a financial institution must create a customer risk profile that is “used to develop a

[https://perma.cc/B7FS-88K8] (providing the list of financial institutions required to file SARs
has continuously expanded from 2002 until present).
60. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Y), (Z) (2012).
61. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1378.
62. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(l)–(2) (2012).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
64. FinCEN Adds Fifth BSA Compliance “Pillar,” NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN.,
https://www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/ncua-report/2017/second-quarter/fincen-adds-fifth
-bsa-compliance-pillar.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z4PV-KFZR].
65. Id.
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baseline against which customer activity is assessed for suspicious activity.”66 This
baseline assists a financial institution in determining whether a customer’s
“transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which
the particular customer would normally be expected to engage,” which would trigger
its duty to file an SAR report.67
In creating the customer risk profile, a financial institution may rely on the
information supplied by customers, so long as “it has no knowledge of facts that
would reasonably call into question the reliability of the information,” although it is
expected to continuously update that information based “on a risk basis.”68 This risk
basis should be “event-driven and occur[] as a result of normal monitoring” for
changes to a customer’s personal information, including beneficial ownership
information.69
The CDD Rule also added “legal entity customers” to the list of customers whose
identities must be verified before a financial institution conducts business with
them.70 Prior to the CDD Rule, financial institutions were only required to address
beneficial ownership for owners of private accounts and for accounts related to
certain foreign financial institutions.71 Financial institutions are now required to
“identify the beneficial owners of legal entity customer accounts” at the time a new
account is opened.72 Legal entity customers include corporations, limited liability
companies, partnerships, and similar domestic and foreign types of businesses. 73
Notably, the verification requirements now extend to “shell” companies,74 which are
often formed by money launderers for the sole purpose of concealing their identities
as the account holders.75
The rule provides three categories of beneficial owners who are covered: (1) any
persons who, directly or indirectly, have a twenty-five percent or greater stake in the
legal entity customer; (2) any single person “with significant responsibility to
control, manage, or direct a legal entity customer” (e.g., the CEO, CFO, General
Partner, or any other person with similar functions); and (3) the trustee of a trust that
has greater than a twenty-five percent equity interest in the legal entity customer.76

66. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29,398, 29,398 (May 11, 2016) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
67. Suspicious Activity Report, 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (2019).
68. 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,398; see also FinCEN Adds Fifth BSA Compliance “Pillar,” supra
note 64.
69. Customer
Due
Diligence—Overview,
FFIEC:
BSA/AML
MANUAL,
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/03_RegulatoryRequirements/02.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FMX3-HZQB].
70. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230 (2019); see also 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,398 (discussing how
the rule functions and how it changes financial institutions’ duties).
71. Adam S. Coto, Customer Due Diligence: FinCEN and the Beneficial Ownership
Requirement for Legal Entity Customers, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 145, 146–47 (2016).
72. Id. at 146.
73. Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity Customers—Overview, FFIEC
BSA/AML MANUAL, https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/03_RegulatoryRequirements
/03.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MC3-KT4C].
74. Story, supra note 4.
75. See Leefeldt, supra note 5; see also supra text accompanying note 31.
76. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230(d)(1)–(3) (2019).
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D. Financial Institutions’ Affirmative Criminal Reporting Duties Under the
BSA/AML Regulatory Regime
The overarching effect of the AML regulatory framework is that financial
institutions must fulfill several affirmative duties to conform with FinCEN’s
expectations and avoid criminal and civil liability. First, by requiring financial
institutions covered by the regulations to share their suspicions of money laundering
through SARs and CTRs, Congress has created a duty to report crimes and suspicions
thereof.77 Secondly, financial institutions have a duty to investigate their customers,
as the SAR requirement and KYC laws require them to maintain records and conduct
inquiries into their customers’ identities and businesses. 78 Lastly, as a result of the
new CDD Rule, financial institutions have a third ongoing duty to monitor their
customers for changes in activity that should be considered suspicious.79
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING MANDATORY DUTIES TO REPORT CRIMES:
EXAMINING THE CONTOURS OF CRIMINAL REPORTING LAWS
Part II of this Note, after establishing that American criminal law generally resists
imposing affirmative duties to report crimes, analyzes the contours of other laws that
create mandatory criminal reporting obligations, including their extent, their
underlying justifications, and their enforcement. From these other laws, Section II.D
identifies some of the normative principles that justify imposing criminal reporting
requirements on private actors. This discussion concludes that criminally punishing
the failure to report crimes does not violate principles of proportionality and fairness
if, on balance, the burden created by the reporting obligation is low, relative to the
social good derived from reporting the crime.80
A. The Law Generally Imposes No Affirmative Duty to Report a Crime
American law traditionally resists imposing affirmative legal duties to act—a
byproduct of the common law’s deeply rooted principles of individual liberty and
autonomy—and similarly resists punishing failures to act with civil or criminal
punishments.81 Instead, criminal laws generally prohibit the commission of socially

77. See supra text accompanying note 53.
78. See supra text accompanying note 62.
79. See supra text accompanying note 65.
80. See, e.g., Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the “Duty to Report” Crimes, 86 UMKC L.
REV. 361, 369–70, 375 (2017) (establishing a framework for evaluating a “duty to report”);
Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1 (questioning the effectiveness of the anti-money
laundering scheme); see also Hearing, supra note 17, at 33 (statement of Heather A. Lowe,
Legal Counsel and Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“[I]t is
critical that Congress understands and carefully weighs the potential benefits against the
potential ramifications that may be negative before making decisions in this area.”).
81. Matthew E. Dyson, Always on Duty: Can I Order You to Report Crimes or to
Intervene?, 224 MIL. L. REV. 176, 181 (2016); Heather Benzmiller, Note, The CyberSamaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent” Bystanders of Cyberbullying,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 927, 946 (2013).
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harmful proscribed acts, creating negative duties not to intentionally make the world
a worse place.82 Laws creating positive duties, in contrast, tell actors what they must
do.83 The underlying rationale is that, although not reporting could be considered
immoral, the proper role of criminal law is not to punish every moral wrongdoing
irrespective of the harm it causes to society.84 Thus, absent a recognizable duty to act
at common law (e.g., parent-child relationship),85 a person is not usually criminally
responsible for what they fail to do.86
The law has generally extended this approach to criminal reporting requirements,
imposing no affirmative duty to report a crime.87 For their part, American courts have
historically found that criminally punishing individuals for omitting to report a crime
is overly harsh.88 For example, the federal statute for the common law crime of
“misprision of felony,” 18 U.S.C. § 4, reads:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon
as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil
or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.89
Facially, the statute is capable of punishing anyone with passive knowledge of a
felony who fails to report it to authorities. However, the federal courts have held that
the law punishes only those individuals who take positive or affirmative steps to

82. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 979.
83. Id.
84. See Kang, supra note 80, at 362.
85. Dressler, supra note 7, at 975–76. Another category of omission liability for special
duties created by statute—for example, the duty to pay taxes by a set date—also exists in
American criminal law. Id. at 976–77; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012). However, the
justifications for these types of laws are typically unquestioned, and they do not implicate the
same issues as BSA/AML criminal reporting laws, which this Note seeks to address. See infra
Section II.D. To be sure, the crime of failing to file a tax return (established by 26 U.S.C. §
7203) makes the act of not filing the return a crime itself, but the duty to file the return arises
regardless of whether an actual or suspected predicate crime has occurred. The information
provided in the return could very well contain criminal information about its subject, but the
government’s interest in enforcing the obligation to file a tax return is much broader than
learning of criminal activity. This aspect largely distinguishes this obligation from even the
statutes discussed in Section II.C., which require the criminal reporting of oneself to
authorities for social harms committed by that individual.
86. Dressler, supra note 7, at 975.
87. Hall, supra note 47, at 643.
88. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575–76 (1822) (“It may be the duty of a
citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge;
but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for
man.”).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
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conceal a crime.90 Similar state misprision statutes have either been repealed,91 or
courts have declined to extend their application to mere omissions to report a crime
to authorities.92 Conceptually, the effect of including an “active concealment”
requirement in the misprision of felony statute is that it functions like most traditional
criminal laws—individuals do not have an affirmative duty to come forward with
their knowledge, but they are not allowed to intentionally act in a way designed to
prevent authorities from discovering the commission of a crime.93
B. State and Federal Statutes Creating Individual Criminal Reporting Duties
Despite the law’s general rejection of a duty to report crimes, various state and
federal statutes carve out exceptions and create civil and criminal punishments for
individuals who fail to do so under specific circumstances.94 Indeed, there are
circumstances in which moral duties to act outweigh the interest in maintaining
individual liberty, especially when the burden of reporting is relatively low.95 For
example, a handful of states have enacted laws that require individuals to report the
commission of specifically enumerated crimes to authorities, creating variants of
“Bad Samaritan” statutes.96 The crimes that trigger reporting duties under “Bad

90. E.g., United States v. Baumgartner, 581 F. App’x 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2014); Bratton v.
United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934); see also Craig Ehrlich, When Minding Your
Own Business Means Speaking Up: Criminally Punishing a Corporate Executive for Failing
to Blow the Whistle on the Illegal Misconduct of a Colleague, 32 J.L. & COM. 255, 268–69
(2014) (citing various federal and circuit court decisions requiring positive concealment to be
found guilty under the federal misprision statute).
91. Gabriel D.M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697,
723 (2003) (stating that Louisiana, Maine, and New Jersey have repealed their misprision of
felony statutes).
92. For example, Colorado has a misprision statute in its criminal code, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-8-115 (West 2013), but the Tenth Circuit held that the law imposed no general
obligation to report a crime, United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir.
1991). Similarly, South Dakota’s and Ohio’s misprision statutes have not been repealed, but
the crimes are rarely, if ever, charged. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (LexisNexis 2014
& Supp. 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-12 (2017); see Ciociola, supra note 91, at 726–
30. Courts in a select few states recognize the common law crime of misprision of felony, but
prosecutors rarely charge individuals with the crime except in extraordinary circumstances.
See generally Ciociola, supra note 91, at 710–21 (discussing how different state courts have
addressed the common law crime of misprision of felony). Most of the courts in the select
states that recognize the crime at common law include a mens rea element or require positive
acts of concealment. Id. In sum, it can be said that the common law crime of misprision is
practically nonexistent in American law. Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268.
93. See Ciociola, supra note 91, at 722–23.
94. See Hall, supra note 47, at 644.
95. Dressler, supra note 7, at 987.
96. For example, a Nebraska statute punishes “[a]ny person who has knowledge of the
theft or loss of explosive materials,” and who does not report it to authorities, with a
misdemeanor. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1226 (LexisNexis 2015). Although the Nebraska
statute creates an affirmative duty to take action, and it criminally punishes omissions thereof,
the only circumstance in which the duty arises is when one knows of the theft or loss of
explosives. See id.
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Samaritan” laws are usually limited in their scope to specific acts of violence against
other individuals.97 Additionally, these laws typically carry light punishments98 and
require that an individual either witnessed the crime99 or had actual knowledge of the
offense.100 The statutes’ mens rea requirements help explain why, despite the fact
that many states have specialized reporting provisions for particular offenses in their
criminal codes, “Bad Samaritan” laws are not frequently enforced.101 Stricter
enforcement would be costly, and it would be difficult for a prosecutor to prove that
a bystander possessed the necessary knowledge or other level of culpability required
by the statute.102
Other state laws impose a narrower reporting duty on members of specific
professions, such as medical care providers and owners of car repair shops, who are
likely to encounter signs of certain types of harm in their line of work.103 These
variants of “Bad Samaritan” laws also tend to have minimal penalties for
noncompliance,104 as well as various mens rea requirements that limit culpability.105
Another unique quality of these “Bad Samaritan” laws is that punishments for
violations appear directly related to the severity of the crime witnessed, rather than
the harm caused by a violator’s inaction. For example, the Michigan statute that
applies to car garage owners who observe bullet damage to vehicles does not specify
a punishment.106 In contrast, violations of the Massachusetts reporting law that
applies to any person who witnesses a sexual assault, murder, manslaughter, or

97. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.69.100 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2005); see also Ciociola, supra
note 91, at 730–31; Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268; Benzmiller, supra note 81, at 950–51.
98. Benzmiller, supra note 81, at 950–51; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6(a)
(West 2008).
99. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.69.100 (West 2019).
100. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1226 (LexisNexis 2015); 3 R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-1-5.1 (2002); see also Ciociola, supra note 91, at 731–34 (listing various statutes that
require individuals to report certain crimes).
101. See Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268; Benzmiller, supra note 91, at 950–51.
102. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 982, 985.
103. Ciociola, supra note 91, at 730–31 (describing this variant of criminal reporting
statutes); Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 271–73.
104. See, e.g., 25 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-14(c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2019) (failure
of medical professional to report an injury sustained in a suspicious or violent manner is
punishable by a fifty dollar to five hundred dollar fine); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-26-5-1, -2 (West
2012) (those in charge of car repair shops who do not report evidence that a vehicle was struck
by a bullet are guilty of a Class C infraction); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411(c) (West
2004) (failure by physician or surgeon to report injuries inflicted by violence punishable as a
misdemeanor).
105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3009 (2018) (creating a duty for
communications officers to report violations within their knowledge of crimes related to
eavesdropping); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(B), (F) (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 2019)
(creating a negligence standard for caregivers who fail to report gunshot or stab wounds or
injuries caused by suspected domestic violence).
106. Id.
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armed robbery are potentially punishable by a $2500 fine.107 The inaction that gives
rise to liability under both crimes is ostensibly the same, so it seems that one’s
culpability is dependent not on a violator’s conduct (or lack thereof), but the
harmfulness of the crime not reported.
The most sweeping and stringently enforced statutes impose a duty to report
crimes against helpless victims—namely, the abuse of children and the elderly.108
Under federal law, all states must have statutes that designate individuals within
certain professions as “mandatory reporters” of child abuse.109 Some states also
include “catch-all” provisions that extend the duty to anyone who develops a
suspicion of abuse.110 This type of criminal reporting statute requires more than the
other variations discussed above because, by imposing a duty to report suspicions of
abuse, the law requires individuals to make difficult, good faith judgments about the
underlying cause of the harm observed.111 State statutes that similarly require
individuals to report instances of elder abuse have been modeled after those related
to child abuse, and both types of reporting laws also extend civil immunity to the
reporters.112
Whether or not a person has failed to fulfill his or her duty to report abuse
resembles a negligence standard, asking if the objective, reasonable person would
have had cause to believe that abuse occurred.113 To further encourage mandatory
reporters to share their suspicions, the statutes include good faith immunity clauses
that protect them in the event that their suspicions are mistaken.114 Thus, although
mandatory reporters do not have a duty to further investigate their customers, clients,

107. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010).
108. Ciociola, supra note 91, at 731–34; Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 271–72; see, e.g., 320
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4 (West 2018).
109. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (2019) (providing information about all states’ mandatory reporting laws).
110. Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty to Report” Statutes
in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 11, 15 (2002).
111. Suzanne M. Nicholls, Responding to the Cries of the Innocent: Holding NonOffending Parents Criminally Responsible for Failing to Protect the Abused Child, 30 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 309, 318 (2007); See Lisa Koverko, Note, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: The
Impact of the Child Protection Law on the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, 88 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 51, 64 (2010).
112. Thompson, supra note 110, at 23.
113. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 413-015-0115(50) (2018) (defining reasonable suspicion);
see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 109, at 3 (“Typically, a report must be
made when the reporter . . . suspects or has reason to believe that a child has been abused or
neglected. Another frequently used standard is the requirement to report in situations in which
the reporter has knowledge of, or observes a child being subjected to, conditions that would
reasonably result in harm to the child.” (emphasis in original)); Nicholls, supra note 111, at
318 (“To determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that child abuse is occurring,
courts use the same standard as that used for permissive reporters—the objective reasonable
person standing in the reporter's position.”);.
114. Nicholls, supra note 111, at 318; Koverko, supra note 111, at 64.
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or patients,115 the expectation that mandatory reporters will not be negligent in
observing signs of child abuse creates a duty to discover crime.116
C. Duties to Report Crimes that Commonly Arise in Specific Industries
Mandatory criminal reporting laws applicable to specific industries may be
justified by a governmental interest in preventing systemic crimes within the
industry.117 Often, the effect of these statutes is to reduce liability or require reporting
in instances where the actor itself is responsible for the harm.118 Criminal selfreporting obligations that are imposed on certain industries prominently arise under
securities laws and environmental laws.119 For instance, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
persons in charge of vessels are expected to report a release of hazardous materials
for which they are responsible.120 Liability under CERCLA for omitting to report a
spill is limited to “persons in charge,” and the statute’s safe harbor provision extends
immunity from criminal liability to self-reporters.121
Another industry-wide reporting requirement mandates that electronic
communication service providers share the identity, location, and communications
of individuals who are involved with child pornography to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children.122 Similar to the mens rea requirements found in
several “Bad Samaritan” laws, violations of the law occur when actors with “actual
knowledge” of the criminal activity omit to file the required reports.123 To assist the
electronic communication service providers in their efforts to identify offenders, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children shares its own information,
including web addresses already known to contain illicit material. 124

115. See Andrew Solomon, Preventing Recurrences of the Cover-Ups at Penn State &
Baylor (and Now Michigan State): Where Does It End?, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 379, 409–
10 (2018).
116. Koverko, supra note 111, at 67; see also Solomon, supra note 115.
117. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 12.
118. Hall, supra note 47, at 646.
119. Id. at 647; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2012). Unlike the other laws discussed in
Section II.C., Sarbanes-Oxley requires internal reporting of financial misconduct to the chief
legal counsel or the chief executive officer of a company. See Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
7245 (2012)). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act is different from the criminal reporting statutes
for the reason that it encourages, but does not require, reporting. See Section 922 of the DoddFrank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1841 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
120. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2772 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012);
see also Thompson, supra note 110, at 33 (describing the conditions under CERCLA that can
create criminal liability for failing to report).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
123. Id.
124. Kang, supra note 80, at 392.
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D. A Framework for Understanding When Imposing Affirmative Duties to Report
Crimes Is Justified
To address the normative question of when it is acceptable for the government to
compel criminal reporting, a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis of
criminal reporting laws can lend valuable insights into their relative levels of fairness
and proportionality.125 One commentator, Sungyong Kang, suggests that the proper
framework for this analysis should consider the moral culpability of the reporter as
determined by the reporter’s relationship to the crime (i.e., victim, offender, or third
party).126 Kang also acknowledged that other factors—including the potential
reporter’s level of knowledge about the crime, the harm caused to the individual
being reported, and the social good produced by the reporting—also bear on this
analysis.127 This Section will examine how these factors apply to the mandatory
criminal reporting laws discussed earlier in Part II to create a benchmark from which
burdens created by the BSA/AML reporting laws can be examined.
The affirmative duties that criminal reporting laws create may be justified by a
societal belief that people in special circumstances should be expected to assist law
enforcement in preventing crime.128 In carving out exceptions to the law’s general
rejection of imposing affirmative duties to act, the reporting laws primarily benefit
society in one of two ways: (1) protecting helpless victims, and (2) preventing
widespread or systemic harms.129 For example, mandatory reporting laws related to
child abuse fall in the first category, and the duties are imposed on licensed
individuals who have already accepted professional duties of care.130 Any additional
burden borne by reporters is minor relative to the obligations that they already owe
and the magnitude of harm that can be prevented by the reporting of child abuse. 131
Moreover, due to the discreet nature of the crime, punishing many offenders would
be much more difficult, if not impossible, but for mandated criminal reporting.132
The position of the reporter relative to the crime also bears on the potential
reporter’s level of knowledge about the commission of a crime. Reporters who are
more certain that a crime occurred and fail to report it are more blameworthy than
individuals who merely suspect one took place.133 Thus, the mens rea requirements
in reporting laws can help make the imposition of the affirmative duties more

125. See id. at 370; see also Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Heather A. Lowe,
Legal Counsel and Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“[I]t is
critical that Congress understands and carefully weighs the potential benefits against the
potential ramifications that may be negative before making decisions in this area.”); Saperstein
et al., supra note 13, at 1 (“The optimal level of banking regulation necessarily requires some
sort of cost-benefit analysis.”).
126. Kang, supra note 80, at 378–79.
127. Id. at 376–78.
128. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
547, 575 (1988).
129. Thompson, supra note 110, at 12.
130. Id.
131. See Hall, supra note 47, at 646.
132. See Kang, supra note 80, at 381.
133. Id. at 376.
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justifiable by limiting who can be held criminally liable to those actors with the
greatest culpability. For instance, most of the variations of “Bad Samaritan” laws
discussed in Section II.B require that an individual either witnessed the crime or had
knowledge of the offense.134 Similarly, the criminal self-reporting statutes applicable
to business associations are not only justified by the fact that the actors themselves
are responsible for the harm, but the potential reporters will also have little doubt
about their own responsibility for the crime committed.135
Under Kang’s cost-benefit approach, a third factor, the social good created by
criminal reporting, can be weighed against the burden imposed on the reporter.136
The social good created by criminal reporting largely depends on the severity of the
harm that the government seeks to deter,137 which helps to distinguish the varying
criminal penalties imposed by the “Bad Samaritan” statutes discussed above. The
mandatory reporting duties related to serious, violent crimes include more stringent
punishments for omissions, even though the other factors (such as the parties’
relationships to the crime and the mens rea requirements) were generally the same.138
Moreover, the burden created is relatively low under all the criminal reporting laws
discussed in Part II, as they require no further action after alerting authorities.139
III. THE EXCEPTIONALLY STRINGENT DUTY TO REPORT CRIME UNDER ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
This Note recognizes that private financial institutions may be in a better position
than government agencies to detect and report money laundering violations,140 as
they are simultaneously violators, victims, and interested third parties to the crime.141
As potential violators who stand to profit, financial institutions are incentivized not
to report financial crimes, which is a factor that supports stricter punishments and
more stringent enforcement of their reporting duties.142 The government, for its part,
has an unquestioned interest in preventing the systemic harms created by money
laundering and terrorist financing—further justifying the imposition of mandatory
criminal reporting requirements on private actors—but to what extent should this

134. See supra text accompanying notes 96–100.
135. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 50. For example, the costs for businesses that selfreport their violations of environmental laws might ultimately be high, as violators are granted
criminal, but not civil, immunity under CERCLA, but the fact that the reporter bears direct
responsibility for causing the harm justifies these costs. Id. at 34. Still, even if a potential
reporter was responsible for an environmental harm, their failure to report may not have caused
the harm or necessarily even aggravated it. Id. at 6.
136. See Kang, supra note 80, at 377.
137. See id.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 105–106.
139. See supra Sections II.B, C.
140. See Kang, supra note 80, at 362.
141. See id. at 364.
142. See Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1371–74 (describing banks’ lax BSA/AML compliance
in the 1970s and 1980s—an era in which banks actively sought ways to avoid reporting
requirements in order to continue conducting business with money launderers).
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practice be allowed?143 Today, federal regulators punish banks even when no money
laundering violations were found to have occurred.144
This Note appreciates the severity of the threats that these crimes pose to the
integrity of the financial system, but it questions the extent to which the
government’s interest in deterring money laundering can reasonably support creating
mandatory criminal reporting duties that shift the government’s own law
enforcement responsibilities to private actors. To address this issue, Part III conducts
a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis of the BSA/AML regulatory
regime.145 This Part focuses first on the qualitative aspects of BSA/AML reporting
obligations, as well as FinCEN’s stringent enforcement of the regulations and the
disproportionate punishments for inadequate compliance, which distinguish AML
criminal reporting duties from the reporting laws discussed in Part II. This Part then
considers recent quantitative data and studies that suggest the economic costs and
burdens of compliance incurred by financial institutions are disproportionate to the
benefits that the law enforcement agencies derive from the current BSA/AML
regulatory regime. Part III concludes that the burdens created by the reporting duties
under the current regime have become excessive and are inconsistent with the
principles discussed in Section II.D. In effect, the AML/BSA regulatory framework
has turned the industry into an unfunded police force.146
A. A Qualitative Analysis of the Affirmative Duties Imposed on Financial
Institutions by AML Laws and Regulations
As discussed in Section I.D of this Note, the overarching effect of the BSA/AML
regulatory framework is that financial institutions must fulfill several affirmative
duties to conform with FinCEN’s expectations and avoid criminal and civil
liability.147 First, financial institutions have a duty to report crimes, as the BSA/AML
regulatory regime mandates that they share their suspicions of financial crimes with
FinCEN by filing SARs and CTRs.148 Secondly, financial institutions have a further

143. This Note maintains that, in some situations, failing to report a crime may be
inherently wrong, mala in se, and that it is the failure to fulfill a moral duty and causation of
social harm that justifies criminal, as opposed to just civil, punishment. See Kang, supra note
80, at 369. Administrative, or regulatory, laws that create civil penalties for violations are
generally less concerned about the violator’s culpability for the offense, often holding the
violators strictly liable. See id. Often, such regulatory actions are justified if their benefits
outweigh their costs. See id. at 369–70 (stating that regulations are often subject to cost-benefit
analyses); see also Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 2 (stating that scholars, Congress, and
courts encourage policymakers to weigh the qualitative and quantitative benefits and costs of
regulations). Because the AML/BSA regime is a hybrid of criminal and administrative law
that includes both civil and criminal punishments for inadequate compliance, see infra Section
III.B, this Section of my Note analyzes financial institutions’ moral culpability for BSA/AML
violations, as well as the economic costs and benefits of the regime.
144. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1.
145. See Kang, supra note 80, at 369–70; Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1–2; see also
supra text accompanying note 125.
146. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 17, at 1.
147. See supra Section I.D.
148. See supra Section I.D.
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duty to investigate, as the KYC regulations require the affected institutions to
maintain records and conduct inquiries into their customers’ identities. 149 Third,
financial institutions are expected to monitor their customers for changes in activity
that indicate illegal activity.150 Before discussing how well compliance is enforced
and the severity of punishments for inadequate compliance, Section III.A analyzes
how financial institutions’ reporting duties are qualitatively distinct, as financial
institutions are held criminally liable for failing to serve as effective law enforcement
agents.
1. BSA/AML Criminal Reporting Duties Are Uniquely Broad, Ambiguous, and
Burdensome Compared to Criminal Reporting Duties Found Elsewhere in the Law
The Patriot Act broadly delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
add almost any business to the list of financial institutions expected to comply with
BSA/AML reporting requirements.151 The result has been that, under the current
regulatory regime, car dealers, travel agencies, and jewelers may be subject to the
same liability as major banks for failing to adequately file reports with FinCEN
without regard for their financial ability to undertake the same compliance
measures.152 Even if the reporting duties can be justified in part by financial
institutions’ professional knowledge about the signs of money laundering—in the
same way that physicians can reasonably be expected to report signs of gunshot
wounds—the indiscriminate application of the reporting requirements still overlooks
two other factors. It ignores the proportionality and fairness of this requirement, as
surely the value of the information that the government hopes to gain from such a
wide range of actors cannot be of equal value.153
Moreover, financial institutions’ reporting duties are particularly burdensome in
light of the fact that their SAR reporting obligations are triggered by a lesser
evidentiary standard than the laws discussed in Part II.154 For example, unlike
mandatory reporters who are required to report their “reasonable suspicions” of child
abuse to authorities,155 financial institutions’ reporting duties may be triggered by

149. See supra Section I.D.
150. See supra Section I.D.
151. Thompson supra note 110, at 27–28.
152. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012); see also Thompson supra note 110, at 28–29 (noting
that several of the institutions that are covered by BSA/AML reporting requirements are only
financial in the sense that they earn revenue, but all are equally required to maintain records
and file SARs). However, some types of businesses, like car dealerships, which are required
to file transaction reports pursuant to BSA authority, are not expected to file other types of
reports, like SARs. Car dealerships, for example, file a Form 8300 for cash payments
exceeding $10,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 6050I (2012).
153. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Heather A. Lowe, Legal Counsel and
Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“The second point I really
wanted to stress here is that AML compliance and reporting is undertaken by a really wide
range of entities and persons going far beyond the banking sector. . . . [A]ny proposed changes
being considered should really be looked at in light of that wide range of actors, those types
of entities and persons.”).
154. See supra Sections II.B, C.
155. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 16.
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any suspicion of possible criminal activity.156 Both actors share a duty to “discover”
crime to some extent,157 and the standards, combined with the threat of criminal
sanctions, create a strong incentive to report.158 In the context of child abuse, it is
very likely good public policy to require anyone, especially professionals like
teachers or doctors, to report their reasonable suspicions, as the victims involved are
among society’s most vulnerable.159
The issue with applying a lesser evidentiary standard to financial institutions,
however, can be explained by the differences in their relationship to the crimes that
the government seeks to deter. Their reporting duties relate not to the third-party
victims, but rather to the potential perpetrators who are actively concealing their
criminal acts from the financial institutions that they hope to defraud.160 The conduct
that should alert financial institutions of when to file SARs is not often readily
identifiable,161 as money launderers intentionally structure their deposits in ways that
are designed to avoid triggering their reporting duties.162 Potential violators include
not only their customers but also insiders within the financial institution, who all
deliberately attempt to avoid committing acts that they know could create
suspicion.163 Compared to mandatory reporters, who are held to a negligence
standard for failing to recognize and report reasonable suspicions of child abuse,164
financial institutions’ duty to “discover” crimes seems to be a much more arduous
task that requires greater attentiveness to comply.165 Moreover, FinCEN does not
share its own relevant information with financial institutions to help ease this burden,
as is the case with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and
electronic communication service providers.166
In effect, the evidentiary standard that triggers the duty to file an SAR rule is a
double-edged sword. Financial institutions may require less certainty about the
validity of their suspicions before reporting, as all possible criminal conduct is
reportable, but this standard also means that good compliance practices must catch a
wider array of activity to avoid criminal and civil liability. To illustrate this point,
the SAR requirement gives financial institutions the power to exercise “prosecutorial
discretion” in deciding what conduct should be considered “suspicious” and reported
to FinCEN.167 Even FinCEN has acknowledged that, in certain situations, “a more

156. Id. at 25; see also 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c) (2018).
157. See supra text accompanying note 115–116.
158. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 18.
159. See id. at 11–13.
160. See supra Section I.A.
161. See Hall, supra note 47, at 651.
162. See supra text accompanying note 41.
163. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 24.
164. See supra text accompanying note 113.
165. For the standards that prosecutors must meet to punish financial institutions that fail
to adopt adequate BSA/AML policies, see infra Section III.B.
166. Kang, supra note 80, at 392–93.
167. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Requirement to Report
Suspicious Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 4326, 4329 (Feb. 5, 1996) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
103, transferred to 31 C.F.R. Ch. X, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 26, 2010)); Hall, supra note
47, at 651.
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involved judgment may need to be made whether a transaction is suspicious within
the meaning of the rule.”168 Given the ambiguity, complexity, and perhaps
subjectivity in the criteria for what should be considered possibly “suspicious” in the
context of money laundering and financial crimes, the SAR rule renders financial
institutions liable for exercising poor judgment, at least according to federal
regulators, about the type of customer conduct that is valuable to law enforcement
agencies.169
2. SAR Reports and “Know Your Customer” Regulations Create an Additional
Burden to Investigate for Crimes
Financial institutions’ responsibility to file SARs also serves as a useful starting
point for discussing their additional investigative duties. As noted above, banks are
authorized to exercise a unique degree of discretion in selecting what kind of
customer behavior is reportable.170 When a bank is alerted of customer activity that
deviates from its risk profile on that customer, the bank, not the government, bears
the responsibility for the additional investigatory work needed to determine whether
a SAR report should be filed.171 To contrast this additional obligation from the
criminal reporting requirements found elsewhere in the law, reporters of child abuse,
for example, owe no additional duty to substantiate the underlying causes of their
reasonable suspicions after reporting them to authorities.172 Financial institutions’
duty to investigate is resource intensive, and as Greg Baer, President of the Clearing
House Association, has pointed out, it requires the institutions “to investigate [their
suspicions] like a law enforcement agency.”173 Although this is a task that law
enforcement is more qualified and better trained to perform, banks’ compliance
professionals, who often account for a greater portion of a bank’s staff than their loan
officers, can spend days conducting exhaustive research to process a single SAR
report.174
In addition, the “Know Your Customer” laws, which obligate financial
institutions to perform inquiries into their customers’ records and affairs when they
open an account, create other investigative duties for financial institutions.175 The
information gained in the course of performing these duties should ideally inform

168. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4329.
169. See Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1.
170. See supra text accompanying note 167.
171. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 14–15 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).
172. See supra text accompanying note 115.
173. Hearing, supra note 17, at 18 (statement of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing House
Association). The Clearing House is a banking association owned by the largest commercial
banks that conducts research on financial regulations and the banking system as a whole. Our
History, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/history [https://perma.cc
/HM6D-G8KX].
174. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 6–7 (statement of Faith Lleva Anderson, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, American Airlines Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the
Credit Union National Association (CUNA)).
175. Thompson, supra note 110, at 29; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
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banks of when a customer’s activities should be considered suspicious and when an
SAR should be filed.176 And federal regulators have, to a great extent, outsourced
their own role in this process to the private sector. Compliance requires financial
institutions to educate their entire staff on the KYC requirements, as the
responsibility for gathering the necessary information to build customers’ risk
profiles often falls on the frontline employees who set up bank accounts.177 The
overall effect of financial institutions’ investigative duties is that they bear
conflicting responsibilities: they are simultaneously expected to serve as the
gatekeepers who prevent money launderers from exploiting the financial system, as
well as the reporters who assist federal agents in creating the paper trail that can be
used to convict criminals.178
3. The CDD Rule Imposes Additional Duties to Monitor and Investigate Customers
Under the new CDD Rule, financial institutions now have an additional duty to
monitor for criminal activity, as financial institutions’ obligation to “identify and
verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers” is ongoing.179
Compliance with the new rule creates additional investigatory burdens for financial
institutions since beneficial ownership information is not easily accessed, as no
statute currently provides for this information to be shared with financial institutions
by the states in which beneficial owners incorporate their business associations. 180
The ambiguities in the “fifth pillar” of effective BSA/AML compliance, which
requires financial institutions to implement risk-based procedures for identifying
changes in customer activity,181 adds to the burden of compliance. For example, to
update customers’ information on a “risk basis,” some financial institutions have
taken extreme steps, including constant monitoring of media for adverse stories about
their customers, to avoid potential liability.182
B. The Enforcement of Punishments for Failing to Fulfill Affirmative Duties Under
the BSA/AML Regulatory Regime
Financial institutions are seemingly punished for their failure to comply with
FinCEN’s own subjective determinations of what proper compliance looks like, even
in the instances where there have been no money laundering violations.183 This
perception of inconsistent enforcement may be due in part to financial institutions’
uncertainty in how to fulfill their criminal reporting requirements. For example, as
discussed earlier in this Note, the ultimate decision of when an SAR report should

176. See supra text accompanying note 67.
177. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 24, (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).
178. A New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 6.
179. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398
(May 11, 2016) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
180. A New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 12.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69.
182. A New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 5.
183. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1.
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be filed rests with the financial institutions.184 Unlike the bright-line duty to file
CTRs, which is triggered by a set monetary threshold, the duty to file SARs is
dependent on financial institutions’ own judgments on the amount of suspicion that
customers’ transactions should generate.185
The bank examination manual, published by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) to guide field examiners when assessing the quality
of banks’ SAR procedures, states that banks “should not be criticized . . . unless the
failure is significant or accompanied by evidence of bad faith.”186 But these terms
are undefined, and despite this stated policy, federal agencies may issue cease and
desist orders, requiring financial institutions to take specific actions to eliminate
deficiencies in their BSA/AML programs, if there is a significant potential for
unreported money laundering offenses.187 Financial institutions will consent to these
cease and desist orders to avoid litigation costs, but if they fail to take the necessary
corrective actions, the OCC may issue additional orders imposing multimillion dollar
civil penalties.188
Moreover, if the U.S. Attorney’s Office files criminal or civil enforcement actions
against financial institutions, the mens rea standard that must be established requires
far less than bad faith. Financial institutions and their individual employees can be
held criminally liable for inadequate compliance,189 but individual employees are
only culpable for criminal punishments if they are found to have “willfully” violated
the reporting requirements.190 In contrast, financial institutions are ostensibly held to
a strict liability standard for inadequate compliance under the criminal penalty
statute.191 After announcing charges, federal prosecutors usually opt for deferred

184. See supra text accompanying note 167.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 168–69.
186. Suspicious Activity Reporting—Overview, FFIEC BSA/AML MANUAL, https://bsaaml
.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/03_RegulatoryRequirements/04.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EYZ9-FDMS].
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i), (s) (2012); Appendix R: Enforcement Guidance, FFIEC
BSA/AML MANUAL, https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/07_Appendices/18.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GTD3-VJDB].
188. See, e.g., Consent Order Between Capital One, N.A. and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, AA-EC-2018-62 (Oct. 23, 2018) (agreeing to a $100 million penalty).
189. Jeffrey R. Boles, Financial Sector Executives as Targets for Money Laundering
Liability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 394 (2015).
190. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012), the statute establishing individual criminal liability,
includes a “willfully” mens rea element, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
require that the defendant had knowledge of the requirement and a purpose to disobey the
reporting requirement. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994). But see 31
U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1) (2012) (excluding a “willfully” mens rea requirement in setting forth
individual criminal liability for those who cause BSA/AML reports not to be filed).
191. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(d), the statute that holds financial institutions liable for violations
of its reporting requirements, does not include a “willfully” mens rea requirement. See also A
New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 23 (“Financial institutions currently operate under a strict
liability, post-hoc regulatory standard that is both opaque and constantly changing.”).
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prosecution agreements,192 which will also include large civil penalties193 and
forfeiture actions.194 When financial institutions have implemented effective
compliance programs, insofar that no actual money laundering offenses or other
crimes were uncovered, they are not necessarily shielded from liability under
BSA/AML regulations.195
The severity of the penalties for inadequate compliance is perhaps the factor that
most distinguishes the BSA/AML regime from other criminal reporting requirements
found elsewhere in the law. This Note provided a few examples of the draconian civil
and criminal fines in its Introduction,196 but to give yet another example of the harsh
penalties for insufficient compliance, Citibank was forced to pay a $70 million
penalty in January 2018 for failing to improve its AML program as mandated in a
2012 consent order.197 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a
bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury tasked with supervising banks,198
cited the bank’s incomplete identification of high-risk customers, inadequate
customer due diligence, and failure to file timely SARs.199 Additionally, the
maximum civil penalties for inadequate BSA/AML compliance increased following
the passage of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of
2015.200 The government’s rationale for this increase—that fines had not kept pace

192. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations of the Bank
Secrecy Act (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney
-announces-criminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank [https://perma.cc/M8AQ8L8D].
193. 31 U.S.C. § 5321 requires that one have “willfully” not implemented BSA/AML
compliance measures to be liable for civil penalties, but “collective knowledge,” “willful
blindness,” or “recklessness,” have all been held to satisfy the mens rea element. See, e.g.,
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57–58 (2007); see also Hall, supra note 47, at
670 (“By eliminating any mens rea defense, Bank of New England virtually imposes strict
liability on banks for compliance with currency transaction reporting requirements.”). This
standard extends to both individuals and organizations. See, e.g., Assessment of Civil Money
Penalty, B.A.K Precious Metals, Inc., No. 2015-12 (Dec. 30, 2015).
194. In addition to civil penalties, financial institutions’ assets that the government can
trace to a “specified unlawful activity” are subject to criminal and civil forfeiture actions. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 981–82 (2012 & Supp. V. 2018). These actions often follow deferred
prosecution agreements and can be particularly harsh. For instance, in 2017, Banamex USA,
after agreeing to pay fines in 2015, was the subject of another enforcement action in 2017 that
led to the forfeiture of $97 million. Corkery & Protess, supra note 12.
195. See Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 4.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.
197. Laura Alix, Citibank Fined $70M for Failing to Fix BSA Deficiencies, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 4, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/citibank-fined-70m-for
-failing-to-fix-bsa-deficiencies [https://perma.cc/UE79-KGXG].
198. About Us, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/index
-about.html [https://perma.cc/KS8D-ENJY].
199. Alix, supra note 197197.
200. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 701, 129 Stat. 584, 599–601
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 2461 note (2012 & Supp. 2016)); see also
Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,876, 11,877 (Mar. 19, 2018)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010) (discussing the Department of the Treasury’s “initial catch-up
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with the rate of inflation—is ironic considering law enforcement’s resistance to
similar increases in the monetary thresholds that trigger banks’ reporting
requirements.201 Based on the formula used in the regulations, the civil penalties for
BSA/AML violations have doubled or nearly doubled.202
C. Data & Studies Suggest that the BSA/AML Regime Is Ineffective and Inefficient
in Deterring Money Laundering
The benefits that the government derives from such strictly enforced criminal
reporting requirements seem to be far out of proportion to the costs incurred by
financial institutions. In 2017, over two million SARs were filed,203 and eighty
percent of CTRs filed were for monetary amounts below $30,000.204 Due to the
volume of reports received, federal law enforcement agencies are unable to read a
vast majority of the CTRs and SARs filed, yet policymakers have not reduced the
scope of financial institutions’ reporting obligations in accordance with the
diminishing utility of the high volume of reports that they receive.205 Rather than
reducing the number of reports that are filed, financial institutions can instead flag
high-value SARs, called “super SARs,” which require the additional step of taking
the report into the offices of federal law enforcement agencies, thereby signaling that
the customer conduct necessitating the report is unusually suspicious.206
Despite FinCEN’s steadfast and continued insistence on maintaining the current
BSA/AML regime,207 financial institutions have spent a growing amount of money
on regulatory compliance and have filed an increasing number of SARs only as
defensive measures to avoid becoming subject to enforcement actions. 208 U.S. firms
spend on average $25.3 billion per year on AML compliance efforts.209 Financial
institutions dedicate a significant portion of this amount toward fulfilling their duties
to verify their customers and assess the risks that they pose—spending as much as

adjustment” prior to a final rules being published).
201. See infra text accompanying note 241.
202. Ignacio A. Sandoval, Bank Secrecy Act Violations Now Come with Significantly
Higher Penalties, MORGAN LEWIS: ALL THINGS FINREG (June 30, 2016),
https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/finreg/2016/06/bank-secrecy-act-violations-now-come
-with-significantly-higher-penalties [https://perma.cc/962L-HYL5].
203. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 8 (statement of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing
House Association).
204. Steven M. D’Antuono, Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit
Finance: Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspectives on Reform, FBI: NEWS (Nov. 29,
2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-money-laundering-and-other-forms
-of-illicit-finance [https://perma.cc/U4SA-59AH].
205. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 14 (statement of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing
House Association) (“Now that we have almost 2 million [SARs] filed per year, there is no
one reading them in the first instance. Instead, what law enforcement does is word searches
against that database.”).
206. Id. at 17 (statement of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing House Association).
207. See infra Section IV.A.
208. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 61 (testimony of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing
House Association).
209. Press Release, LexisNexis Risk Sols., supra note 16.
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$500 million per year to comply with KYC provisions of the BSA/AML regime.210
The addition of the new CDD Rule will compound this issue, as FinCEN has
predicted that the additional CDD requirements will cost financial institutions
between $1.15 billion and $2.15 billion to comply over a ten-year period.211
For some smaller financial institutions, BSA/AML compliance costs amount to
ten percent of their total expenses, resulting in organizational structures in which
more bank’s staff members are dedicated to compliance efforts than its actual
banking operations.212 These costs will not be borne entirely by the financial
institutions either, as the portions of their budgets dedicated to BSA/AML
compliance will no longer be available for providing loans and other services, and
the costs will be further passed on to customers through higher fees and rates.213 To
explain how high compliance costs directly hinder banks’ ability to perform their
primary business functions, Lloyd DeVaux, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Sunstate Bank, testified at a congressional hearing in 2017 that “[e]very
$100,000 spent on compliance translates to a million dollars less that we can lend.”214
Economically disadvantaged customers are particularly harmed as a consequence
of the costs and perverse incentives produced by the current AML regime. Banks, in
a practice known as “derisking,” are reluctant to conduct business with customers
with ties to countries that they perceive to be more risky out of their fear of
enforcement actions.215 For example, Banamex USA, the Citigroup subsidiary bank
currently being dissolved following civil penalties for inadequate BSA/AML
compliance, was originally acquired by Citigroup in 2001 to improve the bank’s
access to Mexico’s market by connecting Mexican immigrants working in the United
States who needed to send money to their relatives at home.216 The issue is that many
of these innocent cash transfers are large enough to trigger financial institutions’
BSA/AML reporting duties, although they are obviously not of the kind that FinCEN
hopes to uncover.217 Customers from other countries, such as Somalia, who also hope
to send money home, have been subject to the same disparate treatment due to the
perverse incentives created by the regime.218

210. John Callahan, Know Your Customer (KYC) Will Be a Great Thing When It Works,
FORBES (July 10, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07
/10/know-your-customer-kyc-will-be-a-great-thing-when-it-works/#203558d38dbb
[https://perma.cc/2S42-K88D].
211. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg.
29,398, 29,432 (May 11, 2016) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1030, 1024, and 1026);
see also Coto, supra note 71, at 161 (accounting for IT costs, some estimates put compliance
costs as high $2 billion per firm, while FinCEN calculated an “‘improbably large’ upper
boundary of $10 billion”).
212. Hearing, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).
213. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 8.
214. Hearing, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).
215. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 5–6.
216. Corkery & Protess, supra note 12.
217. See Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 6.
218. Id.

676

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:649

IV. THE CASE FOR REFORM: HOW RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
COULD BALANCE THE COSTS IMPOSED BY THE BSA/AML REGULATORY REGIME
Part IV builds upon Part III by analyzing the ways in which reforming the
regulatory scheme could reduce the excessive burdens imposed on financial
institutions without compromising the federal government’s law enforcement and
national security interests. Although the financial-service industry has consistently
lobbied for less stringent reporting requirements, its public opposition to the
expansion of AML reporting requirements was largely muted after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, as many in the industry feared that opposition to the
additional AML regulations would appear unpatriotic.219 More recently though,
members of Congress and other policymakers have appeared more sympathetic
toward financial institutions’ longstanding complaints, as proposed legislation that
would reform the current BSA/AML regulatory regime has received bipartisan
support.220
This Part first considers the financial industry’s major criticisms of their reporting
duties, as well as the responses of federal regulators who continue to express their
unwavering belief in the value of the information that financial institutions are
required to share.221 Next, this Part examines viable options for reform—some of
which are currently included in bills before Congress.222
A. Financial Institutions Seek Greater Efficiency, Clarity, and Feedback Under
AML Regulations
Recent criticisms from leaders in the financial system suggest that the reporting
requirements under the current AML regime fail to efficiently fulfill their intended
purposes. The Clearing House Association (“The Clearing House”) has been at the
forefront of this criticism.223 In February 2017, The Clearing House published a
comprehensive report, A New Paradigm, that suggested areas in the BSA/AML
framework in need of immediate reform.224 One fundamental problem the association
has identified is the lack of feedback made available to institutions about the utility
and effectiveness of the information they provide.225 Financial institutions have
expressed their collective frustrations about this lack of transparency, as they have
been forced to carefully reevaluate their AML compliance practices, at their own
expense, in response to recent enforcement actions for inadequate compliance, which

219. See Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1378 (discussing how many of the debates that
surrounded the expansion of AML regulations in the Patriot Act dated back to the 1970s).
220. Ian McKendry, With Dodd-Frank Relief Near, Banks Set Sights on AML, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 5, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/with-dodd-frank-relief-near
-banks-set-sights-on-aml [https://perma.cc/NDY6-YHEM].
221. See infra Section IV.A.
222. See infra Section IV.B.
223. See supra note 173 for a description of the organizational mission of The Clearing
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are brought in a seemingly inconsistent and unpredictable fashion.226 Given the lack
of guidance on the kind of customer activity that should generate SAR reports,227
leaders in the banking industry believe that greater feedback on the value of their
reports will allow financial institutions to more efficiently identify and prioritize the
activity that federal agents find the most helpful in catching criminals. 228
In connection with the agency’s efforts to provide more feedback and greater
transparency to financial institutions, FinCEN provides case examples on its website
that partially illuminate how federal agencies use the reports filed pursuant to AML
regulations in enforcement actions.229 But the agency still does not provide data on
how many SARs sent by financial institutions are actually reviewed by government
authorities or ultimately lead to arrests.230 Although FinCEN committed to reviewing
the efficiency of the BSA/AML regulatory scheme in 2007,231 the penalties levied
against banks for inadequate BSA/AML compliance soared during the Obama
administration, and the trend of more enforcement actions and higher penalties
appears to have survived the change in administrations.232 Under the Trump
administration, FinCEN has continued to maintain that the reports received from
financial institutions are indispensable to combating money laundering and terrorist
financing because they reveal personal information, previously unknown addresses,
business associations, banking and travel habits, and communication methods of
suspects.233 At the National Anti-Money Laundering Conference & Expo in August
2018, FinCEN Director Kenneth Blanco reaffirmed the value of the information
provided by financial institutions, emphasizing that 149 SAR review teams analyze
BSA/AML data on behalf of 500 law enforcement agencies that regularly make
queries into the database.234

226. The Clearing House Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule – Customer Due
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions 3 (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.theclearing
house.org/-/media/files/association-related-documents/20141003-tch
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Still, leaders in the industry have increasingly complained that the reports filed
pursuant to BSA/AML regulations, particularly SARs, are not an efficient
mechanism for supporting law enforcement agencies’ efforts to combat money
laundering. The unpredictability of enforcement actions has incentivized covered
institutions to overreport their customers’ suspicious activities in order to minimize
the risk of facing penalties for inadequate compliance.235 Further, banking officials
feel that their professional knowledge about money laundering offenses no longer
justifies their performance of additional investigatory duties on behalf of law
enforcement.236 Instead, financial institutions are willing to turn over bulk data to
federal agencies, which can use advanced data analytics to sift through the
information just as efficiently.237 This solution could reduce regulators’ reliance on
criminal reporting by shifting the responsibility for discovering bad actors back to
the government.
B. Federal Policymakers Should Adopt BSA/AML Regulatory Reform Measures
that Balance the Public and Private Sectors’ Responsibilities for Combating
Financial Crime
Introduced to Congress in June 2018, the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance
Act (“CTIFA”) aimed to increase the dollar thresholds that trigger reporting duties,
allow greater information sharing between financial institutions, and give FinCEN
the authority to issue “no-action letters” in response to a financial institution’s
inquiry about the applicability of BSA/AML regulations.238 CTIFA died in the U.S.
House of Representatives at the end of the 115th Congress’s session,239 but
proponents of the bill hoped that updating the reporting thresholds would lessen the
compliance burden imposed by the BSA/AML regulatory regime by reducing the
volume of SARs and CTRs that must be filed.240 Opponents, including some federal
agents who rely on CTRs and SARs in their criminal investigations, resisted the
proposed increased thresholds. For example, Steven D’Antuono, the Section Chief
of the FBI’s Criminal Investigation Unit, pointed to terrorists’ frequent use of smalldollar transactions in his testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
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Affairs Committee in November 2018.241 Section Chief D’Antuono noted that eighty
percent of the CTRs filed were for dollar amounts below $30,000 in 2017, but he
provided at least some examples of CTRs filed in response to small-dollar
transactions that resulted in important investigations and prosecutions for terrorism
and other crimes.242 However, as Congressmen Blaine Luetkemeyer and Steve
Pearce pointed out, the current $10,000 threshold that triggers CTR reporting
duties243 was set in 1970 and is equal to more than $60,000 when measured in today’s
dollars.244 The proponents of the CTIFA maintained that, by raising the dollar
amount to $30,000, the government’s law enforcement interests would be largely
maintained, as federal regulators would no longer be forced to examine countless
reports with no connection to money laundering offenses or other crimes.245
Further, the CTIFA, by extending the current safe harbor provisions to those who
adopt new compliance technologies, 246 would have reduced future costs of effective
compliance by encouraging innovative ways to catch money laundering offenses.
The caveat to this provision is that it would have cut againsthe adoption of another
proposed solution, which is for the government to rely on modern technology to
develop resources of its own that mine financial data for evidence of money
laundering offenses.247 However, assuming that financial institutions’ relationship to
the crime of money laundering continues to justify the imposition of some reporting
requirement, new technologies and software programs that use data analytics and
other advanced metrics would allow institutions to meet their compliance objectives
at lower costs.248 These technologies, which would primarily rely on algorithms
produced by big data and artificial intelligence, would still necessitate more detailed
feedback from FinCEN on the effectiveness of SAR reports in order to effectively
and more efficiently identify the transactions that are of the most value to federal law
enforcement agents.249
But if federal policymakers are unwilling to expand the current safe harbors, as
the CTIFA proposed, the laws can be amended in other ways that would incentivize
the innovation of new methods for detecting money laundering offenses. One
commentator, Cory Howard, has suggested that the BSA/AML regime could include
a “broad affirmative defense that would shield financial institutions from regulatory
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enforcement actions in certain situations.”250 The “BSA/AML affirmative defense”
would reduce the punitive nature of the regulatory regime’s strict-liability standards
and lessen the appearance of subjectivity in how FinCEN evaluates compliance
programs.251 But in order for it to apply, financial institutions would be required to
establish that they conduct routine maintenance on their compliance programs and
report shortcomings to the appropriate regulatory body when they are discovered. 252
Because the BSA/AML affirmative defense would be unavailable to financial
institutions that fail to undertake these measures, the law would likely encourage
greater investment in compliance systems and personnel.253 Thus, the additional
requirements might not reduce compliance costs, but they would encourage greater
cooperation and transparency between financial institutions and law enforcement
agencies.254
One notable shortcoming in the CTIFA was the absence of a beneficial ownership
provision that would decrease the additional costs and burdens imposed on financial
institutions by the CDD Rule. For instance, The Clearing House has expressed
support for a statute that would require states to record the beneficial ownership of
the legal entities that incorporate under their laws and that would be available to
financial institutions.255 The Corporate Transparency Act of 2017256 would have
responded to this request by requiring “an entity that forms a corporation or limited
liability company to disclose information about its beneficial owners.”257 If the state
of incorporation did not require this information by law, then the entity must have
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program, which evaluates the institution’s current program, the risk of its
operations, the existence and strength of current controls, and the resulting
residual risk of its business activities; and
(b) The financial institution did not unreasonably fail to take any preventive or
corrective actions after discovering the alleged defects in its compliance program
or fail to report such defects to the appropriate regulatory body within a
reasonable time of discovery.
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directly filed the information with FinCEN.258 This provision, although originally
included as part of the CTIFA, was later stripped from the revised version of the bill
that appeared before Congress.259
The Corporate Transparency Act of 2017’s successor, the Corporate
Transparency Act of 2019 (CTA), reintroduced the beneficial ownership requirement
to Congress, but the bill died in the Senate after it was passed in the House of
Representatives.260 Had it been enacted, the CTA would have made it more difficult
for underlying bad actors to hide behind a veil of corporate secrecy by requiring
companies to annually file with FinCEN a list of its current beneficial owners and
any changes in beneficial ownership that occurred during the previous year.261 The
CTA allocates the responsibility for collecting and maintaining this data to FinCEN,
which will provide the information to financial institutions complying with their
“know your customer” obligations.262
CONCLUSION
The normative questions this Note seeks to address, whether financial institutions
should be subject to criminal reporting requirements, and to what extent, demand a
closer examination of financial institutions’ relationship to the crime of money
laundering. Although the government’s interest in deterring money laundering
deserves fair consideration, and financial institutions undoubtedly should bear some
responsibility for ensuring that they do not profit from criminals who exploit the
nation’s financial system, this Note argues that financial institutions’ duties under
the BSA/AML regulatory regime should be reformed to limit the extent that federal
agencies can outsource their own law enforcement duties to private actors.
One can point to other actors who, like financial institutions, have unique
relationships to certain crimes in that they can be considered violators, victims, or
interested third parties to the crimes. For example, criminals often use social media
platforms like Twitter and Facebook to plan and organize serious criminal acts, yet
the actors who own and operate these platforms currently have no affirmative duties
to investigate their customers for criminal activity or to report their knowledge
thereof to authorities.263 Indeed, under the current trend of expanding criminal
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reporting duties,264 it would seem logical to continue to broaden the scope of both
the actors legally required to report crimes and the types of crimes that they are
required to report. Under the same crime-deterrence rationale used to justify the
BSA/AML regulatory scheme, cell phone companies and internet service providers
could also be mandated to perform the same affirmative duties.265 The information
that these private actors could share would surely be highly valuable to law
enforcement agencies, but the question, of course, becomes: to what extent can
private actors be deputized to serve as the eyes and ears of law enforcement before
such policies should be rejected for their inconsistency with accepted principles of
American law?
This Note concludes that such policies violate notions of fairness and
proportionality when the burdens imposed on private actors outweigh their overall
benefits to society. Although financial institutions should bear some burden, the
proper extent of their criminal reporting duties could be resolved in part by
conducting a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis. By implementing
some of the reform measures discussed in this Note,266 the burdens would be more
equally shared by the public and private sectors.
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